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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper explores the rise of the creative industries, whose development marks 
an increasingly central element of contemporary economies, whose form is 
informational, global and networked. It begins with a discussion of the various 
ways in which the creative industries have been defined, in both policy statements 
and in the academic literature. It relates the development of the creative 
industries to three trends. First, it is connected to has the development of cultural 
industries as an object of public policy, as well as a critical rethinking of the best 
means by which cultural development can be supported through cultural policy. 
Second, the rise of the knowledge-based economy, and debates about the 
relationship between information, knowledge and creativity, have provided a 
stimulus to creative industries development. Third, the shift from manufacturing 
to services as the dominant employment sector has raised important issues about 
 2
the nature of services sector employment and the services industry model. Finally, 
there is a discussion of the significance of creative industries development to the 
concept of cluster development and policies to promote the development of 
creative cities and regions, as part of the ‘night time economy’.  
 
Introduction 
 
The emergence of creative industries is related to the rise of cultural industries, 
the significance of knowledge to all aspects of economic production, distribution 
and consumption, and the growing importance of the services sector. It is linked 
to the dynamics of the ‘new economy’, whose form is increasingly informational, 
global and networked (Castells 2000). Cultural processes such as design and 
signification impact upon all aspects of everyday life, particularly those related to 
the consumption of commodities. Culture is thus recast from being a distinct 
sphere of social life, to something that permeates everything from the design of 
urban spaces, offices, means of transport and communication (eg. the design of 
cars or mobile phones), the ways in which clothing signifies an identity to both its 
users and those who see the user, and the promotional strategies of corporations 
and, indeed, governments in an era of ‘promotional culture’ and electronic 
commerce. Similarly, creativity does not simply reside in the arts or media 
industries, but is a central- and increasingly important- input into all sectors where 
design and content form the basis of competitive advantage in global economic 
markets.  
 
This turn to the creative industries results in part from the scope of ICTs to allow 
for greater flexibility in production, such as small batch production rather than 
long production runs. It is also connected to a growing reflexivity in consumption, 
or a process whereby consumers increasingly use commodities to construct a 
personal identity. Scott Lash and John Urry have termed this the ‘semiotisation of 
consumption’ (Lash and Urry 1994: 61), that is a part of what Mike Featherstone 
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has identified, more broadly, as the ‘aestheticisation of everyday life’, connected 
to consumer society and the blurring of lines between art, aesthetics and popular 
culture (Featherstone 1991). Lash and Urry also observe that ‘specialised 
consumption and flexible production entail knowledge-intensive production’ 
(Lash and Urry 1994: 60), defined not only in terms of a greater need and capacity 
to process information, but also in terms of the capacity to creatively understand 
and respond to aesthetic signifiers and other non-informational- principally 
cultural- symbols.  
 
Defining the Creative Industries 
 
The formal origins of the concept of the creative industries can be found in the 
Blair Labour Government’s establishment of a Creative Industries Task Force 
after its election in Britain in 1997, where the newly-created Department of 
Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) set about mapping current activity in the 
creative industries, and identify policy measures that could promote their further 
development. The Creative Industries Mapping Document, prepared by the UK 
DCMS in 1998, defined creative industries as ‘those activities which have their 
origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have the potential for 
wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual 
property’ (www.culture.gov.uk/creative/creative_ industries.html). In a similar 
vein, the Minister for Culture and Heritage, Chris Smith, observed that: 
 
The role of creative enterprise and cultural contribution ... is a key 
economic issue … The value stemming from the creation of intellectual 
capital is becoming increasingly important as an economic component of 
national wealth ... Industries, many of them new, that rely on creativity 
and imaginative intellectual property, are becoming the most rapidly 
growing and important part of our national economy.  They are where the 
jobs and the wealth of the future are going to be generated (Smith, 1998).  
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The Manchester Institute for Popular Culture (www.mmu.ac.uk/h-ss/mipc) has 
identified creative industries initiatives in the cities of Barcelona (Spain), 
Goteburg (Denmark), Milan (Italy), Jamtland (Sweden), Tilburg (Netherlands), 
Berlin (Germany), Helsinki (Finland), and Dublin (Ireland). In East Asia, the 
governments of Singapore and Malaysia, who were pioneers in developing 
networked broadband infrastructure through their ‘Intelligent Island’ and 
Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) initiatives, have been increasingly focusing 
their attention upon the development of industries that can produce content for 
broadband services. In Australia, the Queensland State Government has invested 
in a Creative Industries Precinct, developing a high-tech urban village in inner 
Brisbane in collaboration with the Queensland University of Technology, while 
the Federal Government has developed a taskforce to assess strategies for 
Australia’s digital content and creative industries. It has identified the relationship 
between digital content and creative industries in the following way: 
 
Digital content and applications produced by the creative industries 
include the output of the computer games industry, web sites, digital video 
arts and digital film and television production covering text, graphics, 
special effects, animation and post-production. Digital content and 
applications are also produced in the fields of new media, music, 
architecture and design, and education and health (DCITA 2001).  
 
Such initiatives are consistent with the identification of content as a new growth 
industry in the context of digitisation and convergence, and the opportunities for 
growth, particularly through promoting the development of start-ups and small-to-
medium enterprises (SMEs), in what the OECD has identified as the ‘copyright 
industries’, or those enterprises creating content for networked broadband services 
(OECD, 1998). Howkins (2001) has observed that in 1997, copyright became the 
U.S. economy’s leading export, and the U.S. produced over $414 billion worth of 
books, films, music, TV programmes and other copyright products in that year. In 
 5
the same year, the Spice Girls were Britain’s leading export, through sales of their 
music, attendances at their film Spice World, and ancillary merchandising.  
 
The UK Creative Industries Task Force identified thirteen sectors that comprised 
the creative industries: 
 
Figure 1 
Creative Industries in the United Kingdom 
• Advertising 
• Architecture 
• Arts and antique markets 
• Crafts 
• Design 
• Designer fashion 
• Film 
• Interactive leisure software 
• Music 
• Television and radio 
• Performing arts 
• Publishing 
• Software 
 
Source: DCMS 1998.  
 
Such listings inherently carry an ad hoc and pragmatic element to them. In the 
UK case, the inclusion of sectors such as architecture and antiques is connected to 
the institutionally alignment of culture with the heritage sector, while the 
inclusion of areas such as designer fashion may reflect both the fact that Britain is 
a world leader in this area, and the Blair Government’s attempts to ‘rebadge’ the 
‘old country’ as ‘Cool Britannia’ (McGuigan 1998). A recurrent feature of 
creative industries initiatives in Britain has been a demarcation between areas 
involved with mass production and distribution and hence more directly 
connected to the market, and the more ‘artist-centred’ areas of culture, which can 
retain a focus upon ‘quality’ as assessed by their peers (O’Connor 1999: 4). 
O’Connor argues that this distinction has arisen from the institutional divide 
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between those areas of the performing and visual arts whose development remains 
predominantly associated with Arts Council subsidy, and those sectors that are 
associated with the new DMCS. In Europe, the term ‘cultural enterprise’ is 
sometimes preferred, with the distinction between private sector-driven activities 
and those associated with culture in a more traditional sense continuing to inform 
cultural policy. O’Connor rejects such demarcations between ‘commercial value’ 
and ‘cultural value’, arguing that: 
 
The commercial sector provides wealth and employment (as do the arts), 
but it is also a prime site of cultural consumption for the vast majority of 
the population. The role of ‘arts’ in this configuration needs to be 
rethought not just ‘defended’ against the vulgar market. For the cultural 
industries have asked questions about the definition of arts and ‘culture’ 
itself. New forms of production, new understandings of ‘culture’, new 
forms of consumption and distribution have over-run the cosy separations 
of ‘art’ and (mass or ‘folk/ethnic’) culture set up by the European state 
funding systems (O’Connor, 1999: 5).  
 
One attempt to define the creative industries more analytically has been 
undertaken by economist Richard Caves, who has defined creative industries in 
these terms: 
 
“Creative” industries supply goods and services that we broadly associate 
with cultural, artistic, or simply entertainment value. They include book 
and magazine publishing, the visual arts (painting and sculpture), the 
performing arts (theatre, opera, concerts, dance), sound recordings, 
cinema and TV films, even fashion and toys and games (Caves, 2000: 1). 
 
Caves has stressed that discussion of the economic properties of creative 
industries, and those who work in them, should be distinguished from debates 
about the pros and cons of public subsidy for the arts. For Caves, the importance 
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of this point arises from the fact that both ‘subsidised’ and ‘unsubsidised’ creative 
industries activities share common elements, including: 
 
1. Considerable uncertainty about the likely demand for creative product, due 
to the fact that creative products are ‘experience goods’, where buyers lack 
information prior to consumption, and where the satisfaction derived is 
largely subjective and intangible; 
2. The ways in which creative producers derive non-economic forms of 
satisfaction from their work and creative activity, but are reliant upon the 
performance of more ‘humdrum’ activities (eg. basic accounting and 
product marketing) in order for such activities to be economically viable; 
3. The frequently collective nature of creative production, and the need to 
develop and maintain creative teams with diverse skills, who often also 
possess diverse interests and expectations about the final product; 
4. The almost infinite variety of creative products available, both within 
particular formats (eg. videos at a rental store), and between formats; 
5. Vertically differentiated skills, or what Caves terms the ‘A list’/ ‘B list’ 
phenomenon, and the ways in which producers or other content 
aggregators rank and assess creative personnel; 
6. The need to coordinate diverse creative activities within a relatively short 
and often finite time frame; 
7. The durability of many cultural products, and the capacity of their 
producers to continue to extract economic rents (eg. copyright payments) 
long after the period of production. 
 
What these characteristics point to, for Caves, is major risk and uncertainty about 
the economic outcomes of creative activities. This uncertainty and risk, and the 
need to spread risk and provide insurance to creative producers, has provided one 
reason for public funding for some creative activities. In commercial terms, risk 
and uncertainty are also managed through contracts, whereby the various parties 
involved in the production and distribution of a creative product seek to manage 
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risk and diversify rewards, based upon the skills and capacities they bring to the 
project and the need to ensure mutual obligation to meet commitments. The 
ongoing management of risks, contracts and creative production processes is a 
factor that leads to industrial organisation in the creative industries, in forms such 
as publishing, recording, broadcasting and film companies to commission 
production and manage distribution; guilds, unions and legal arrangements to 
protect creative producers; and intermediaries such as agents to manage the more 
commercial elements of a career in  creative practice.  
 
A significant problem with Caves’ analysis is that, because he is concerned with 
applying common tools to a diverse range of creative industries, he is reluctant to 
differentiate new forms of creative industry (such as games and interactive 
multimedia), from more traditional cultural industries such as film or TV, or from 
the subsidised arts. In Living on Thin Air: The New Economy (Leadbeater, 1999), 
Leadbeater links the creative industries to ‘new economy’ dynamics by 
identifying the key to creative industries as being the alignment of micro-
businesses and SMEs in the content creation area, where creativity largely resides, 
with large cultural organisations- both public and private- that can provide 
national and international distribution networks to realise commercial value from 
this creativity:  
 
Creative industries, such as music, entertainment and fashion, are driven 
… not by trained professionals but cultural entrepreneurs who make the 
most of other people’s talent and creativity. In creative industries, large 
organisations provide access to the market, through retailing and 
distribution, but the creativity comes from a pool of independent content 
producers (Leadbeater, 1999: 49).   
 
The relationship of creative industries to the knowledge economy, cultural 
industries, and the services industries sector, is central to understanding the 
dynamics of the new economy. As ‘new growth’ economics identifies innovation 
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as the principal source of economic growth (eg. Boulding 1996; David 1999), and 
as it is observed that sustained processes of technological and economic 
innovation need to be underpinned by social, cultural and institutional innovation, 
the question of what are the conditions that support or retard creativity has 
become one that is not only of interest to those involved with the creative 
industries, but has come to be of interest to policy makers worldwide. Manuel 
Castells has observed that the new economy is cultural, in that its dynamics are 
dependent upon ‘the culture of innovation, the culture of risk, the culture of 
expectations, and ultimately, on the culture of hope in the future’ (Castells 2001: 
112).  
 
Cultural Industries and Cultural Policy: Three Stages of 
Development 
  
The concept of the cultural industries was first developed, albeit in a bitterly 
ironic fashion, by the German Marxists Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer 
(1977), in their critique of the industrialization of culture in advanced capitalist 
societies. For Adorno and Horkheimer, the industrialization of culture, and its 
absorption within capitalist industry and commodity aesthetics, meant the 
negation of ‘true’ art and culture, and the artificial differentiation of cultural 
commodities in the context of overall standardization and mass production. 
Adorno and Horkheimer’s account of the culture industries has been critiqued 
from a number of standpoints (Bennett, 1982; Mattelart and Piemme, 1982; 
Thompson, 1991; Sinclair 1996). John Thompson summarises the problems with 
the Frankfurt School approach with his observations that it presents ‘an 
exaggerated view of the cohesive character of modern societies and an overly 
pessimistic prognosis concerning the fate of the individual in the modern era’ 
(Thompson, 1991: 97). Moreover, by developing a critique of the cultural 
industries that saw an ideal form of culture as one that was ‘too closely connected 
with nostalgia for a cultural experience untainted by technology’ (Mattelart and 
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Piemme, 1982: 52), it lost sight of the overall economic dynamics of the 
industries that provided mass communication and cultural goods and services.  
 
The elitist disdain for mass media and commercial culture found in early accounts 
of the cultural industries was to some extent mirrored in traditional rationales for 
arts policy. Early forms of arts and cultural policy strictly demarcated between 
publicly supported ‘excellence’, and popular arts and cultural forms that were 
primarily commercial in orientation. In traditional arts policy models, 
governments supported the production and exhibition of art forms such as opera, 
orchestras, theatre, the visual arts, dance and literature, on the basis of: 
 
1. A discourse of social improvement, and a belief that such cultural forms 
have intrinsic worth to the community; 
2. Systems of public subsidy, whereby government financial support was 
provided on the grounds that these forms were not otherwise commercially 
viable; 
3. Promotion of national culture, and the belief that ‘elite’ arts could best 
represent national character and cultural aspirations. 
 
What resulted was a paradoxical situation whereby cultural activities became the 
focus of arts policy only to the extent that they failed to reach sufficiently large 
audiences to be commercially viable. In a study commissioned by UNESCO, 
Augustin Girard observed this central paradox of national cultural policies that 
had promoted state-funded cultural activities with limited impact, while largely 
ignoring and often condemning the commercial sector of the cultural industries. 
Girard argued that, contrary to such cultural policy assumptions, ‘far more is done 
to democratise and decentralise culture with the industrial products available on 
the market than with the “products” subsidised by the public authorities’ (Girard, 
1982: 25). Indeed, the legacy of the ‘left-pessimist’ position had proved to be 
politically counter-productive, since, in its focus upon supporting those areas of 
arts and culture least contaminated by commerce, it supported those activities 
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with the lowest rates of growth in consumption and the strongest class biases in 
terms of who consumed them (DiMaggio and Useem, 1978).   
 
A second, and more productive approach to understanding the cultural industries 
emerged in Europe, and particularly in Britain, in the 1980s. Political economist 
Nicholas Garnham, advising the Greater London Council (GLC) in the early 
1980s, observed that a central danger of what he termed the ‘idealist’ tradition in 
cultural analysis, that rejected the market and focused on a residual approach to 
public intervention in the cultural sector, was that: 
 
 Most people’s cultural needs and aspirations are being, for better or 
worse, supplied by the market as goods and services. If one turns one’s 
back on an analysis of that dominant cultural process, one cannot 
understand either the culture of our time or the challenges and 
opportunities which that dominant culture offers to public policy makers. 
(Garnham, 1987: 24-25)  
 
Rather than defining cultural industries in terms of their difference from the 
products of mass production and distribution, Garnham offered a more descriptive 
definition of the cultural industries as ‘those institutions in our society which 
employ the characteristic modes of production and organisation of industrial 
corporations, to produce and disseminate symbols in the forms of cultural goods 
and services, generally, although not exclusively, as commodities’ (Garnham, 
1987: 25). For Garnham and other cultural policy theorists (eg. Mulgan and 
Worpole, 1986; Lewis, 1990), such an approach pointed to the need to get a better 
understanding of how cultural industries and cultural markets actually worked. 
One of Garnham’s most significant findings was that the media sectors were far 
more important in the United Kingdom as employers of labour, objects of 
consumption, and areas of public intervention, than the traditional performing and 
visual arts, defined as those which received support through Government arts 
funding. 
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These analytical frameworks were drawn upon in Britain by groups working with 
Labour-controlled local councils in cities hard hit by industrial decline, such as 
Bradford, Sheffield, and Glasgow. In Australia, cultural industries research was 
developed through the Australian Key Centre for Cultural and Media Policy (eg. 
Bennett, 1998), and informed the Keating Labor Government’s Creative Nation 
cultural policy statement, released in 1994 (DoCA, 1994). Such approaches 
understood cultural industries as being important in terms of their contribution to 
national economic development, and pointed to the value-adding possibilities 
arising from effective policy development, particularly in relation to developing 
the cultural industries value chain, or ensuring that the products and outputs of 
artistic creativity were better distributed and marketed to audiences and 
consumers.  
 
This expanded definition of cultural industries also enabled media policy to be 
seen as a form of cultural policy, in line with shifting notions of culture from 
aesthetic excellence to the whole way of life of a community. Cultural policy also 
sought to reach sectors, such as popular music, that had typically not been well 
served by traditional arts policy, as well as emergent sectors such as multimedia 
(Breen 1999; Comonos 1996). The focus on the arts and cultural industries as 
having economic importance also led to a burgeoning literature on the economic 
value of the arts, that identified a new role for arts and cultural industries as 
generating flow-on and multiplier effects for other industries, and as important to 
quality of life, the ‘image’ of cities and regions, tourism, and ancillary service 
industries (Myerscough et. al. 1988; cf. Gibson 1999; Throsby 2000).  
 
 These second-stage analyses of the cultural industries broadened and enriched 
debates about the role of cultural policy quite considerably. At the same time, a 
number of abiding problems emerged. The first was definitional. If cultural 
industries were defined in general terms as those sectors involved in the 
production of symbolic goods and services, was it then possible to exclude any 
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activity of industrial production that had a symbolic dimension? Was the design 
and branding of a Coca-Cola can a part of the cultural industries, or the use of 
indigenous artwork on a QANTAS jet, or the design of mobile phones, or the use 
of music by artists such as Moby or Fatboy Slim to promote the sale of those 
phones? The definitions of culture drawn from cultural theory were of little help 
in making these distinctions, divided between an aesthetic definition which tended 
to equate culture with the subsidised arts, and an anthropological definition of 
culture as a way of life that was so all-inclusive as to prevent almost any realm of 
human activity from being defined as ‘cultural’. The issue is also not simply 
rhetorical since, as creativity becomes a value-adding service to a range of 
enterprises, the sorts of investment in creativity and cultural development that 
may lever the best policy outcomes may not necessarily be delivered through 
those institutions and practices deemed by policy-makers to be ‘cultural’ 
(O’Regan 2001).  
 
The second problem, which is derived from the first, was that, in practice, cultural 
industries tended to be largely defined as those activities that were under the 
policy purview of those areas of government that were already defined as 
responsible for the administration of culture. The Australian Creative Nation 
statement, to take one example, identified cultural policy as being responsible for 
such areas as: performing arts; orchestras; contemporary music; literature; dance; 
visual arts and crafts; film; television; radio; multimedia; built heritage; cultural 
property; indigenous cultural heritage; open learning; and libraries (DoCA, 1994). 
Within this list, there were areas that more obviously attracted governmental 
support than others- orchestras rather than contemporary music, and film and 
television more than radio- but the point remains that the bases of support were 
defined primarily by the areas that were within the policy domain of the 
Department of Communications and the Arts. Indeed, in an earlier policy 
statement (DASET, 1991), media industries such as television and radio were 
absent from cultural policy, on the basis that they were at that time administered 
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by a different government department, responsible for transport and 
communication.  
 
This ad hoc element in defining the cultural industries for policy purposes should 
not be seen as accidental. What has become increasingly apparent in policy 
debates around the cultural industries, is the extent to which they have been drawn 
upon by traditional elements of the subsidised arts, that have been able to 
selectively use the economic discourses surrounding cultural industries, 
particularly the elements associated with market failure- such as public good, 
merit good and externality arguments- to accommodate more traditional 
arguments for arts subsidy (Craik, 2000). For their critics, such arguments have 
been based upon a combination of state paternalism and special pleading, and use 
contemporary economic analysis in order to justify the continued use of public 
revenue for the benefit of particular well-organised interests, and present the 
associated danger of policy-makers being ‘captured’ by these special interests 
(Court, 1994; Peacock, 1997). As Justin O’Connor has noted in the British case, 
‘The economic aspect [of cultural industries] was mostly used opportunistically 
by arts agencies or city cultural agencies concerned to bolster their defences 
against financial cuts and ideological onslaught by the conservative government’ 
(O’Connor, 1999: 4).  
 
Arguments justifying the continuation of existing forms of arts and cultural 
funding while broadening the definition of the cultural industries also exposed the 
problem of inappropriate mechanisms to support emergent cultural industries 
sectors. While cultural industries discourses stressed the economic value of 
artistic and cultural activities, they were also widely seen as being about 
providing new forms of legitimation for traditional arts and cultural sectors. As a 
result, they were not seen as willing to address the limitations of traditional forms 
of cultural policy, such as the difficulties faced in broadening the 
audience/consumption base beyond higher-income earners with the requisite 
levels of cultural capital (Gibson 1999), and a perception of decision-makers 
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being ‘captured’ by their clients, and a tendency for peer assessment to encourage 
familiar patterns of funding and be based on pre-existing affinity networks (Court 
1994; Madden 2001). Moreover, such frameworks have been unable to engage 
with sectors such as popular music and multimedia, which are highly dispersed in 
their employment and participation patterns, largely operate without strong 
representation by industry bodies, and are characterised by decision-making 
processes that are incompatible with the timeframes required for bureaucratic 
allocation of resources (eg. Brown et. al. 2000; Flew et. al. 2001).  
 
Creativity, Content and the Knowledge-Based Economy 
 
A better case for supporting artistic and creative activities may arise from a better 
understanding of the relationship between information, knowledge and creativity, 
and the ways in which sustained technological and economic innovation is 
accompanied by social, cultural and institutional innovation, and the existence of 
cultural formations that promote innovation and risk-taking. The emergence of a 
knowledge-based economy has been identified as a central trend in modern 
economies, in recognition of the increasingly important role of information, 
technology and learning in economic performance (OECD 1996). Structural 
transformations towards a knowledge-based economy include: 
 
1. The shift of economic activities towards more knowledge-intensive 
sectors, particularly those involving extensive application of ICTs; 
2. Changing patterns of investment, with a growing emphasis upon 
investment in ‘intangibles’, such as research and development, 
organisational restructuring, and ICTs; 
3. A general ‘upskilling’ of the workforce across all economic sectors; 
4. Growth in exports of high technology products. 
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Charles Leadbeater has defined the role of knowledge in the new economy in 
these terms: 
 
In the new economy more of the value of manufactured products will come 
form the software and intelligence that they embody, and more of what we 
consume will be in the form of services. Across all sectors the knowledge 
content of products and processes is rising … Knowledge push and market 
pull have made know-how the critical source of competitive advantage in 
the modern economy (Leadbeater 1999: 39).  
 
The concept of knowledge push refers to the growth in outputs in education and 
scientific research arising from public and private investment, and the ways in 
which ICTs speed up the production, collection and dissemination of such 
research outcomes, enabling more rapid transformation into new products, 
services, activities and processes. Market pull factors that promote the rise of a 
knowledge economy include economic globalisation, increased competition, 
greater sophistication in consumer demand, and the growing importance of 
intangible assets, such as branding and know-how, to competitive advantage. 
Leadbeater emphasises that this phenomenon is not confined to the high-tech 
industries or elite knowledge workers.  Rather, ‘the increased supply of know-
how and the growing demand for innovation affect virtually every part of the 
economy and all organisations within it, large and small, manufacturing and 
services, high-tech and low-tech, public and private’ (Leadbeater 1999: 47). 
 
 Brown and Duguid (2000) have pointed out that knowledge is not synonymous 
with information. At an epistemological level, they distinguish knowledge from 
information on the basis of the personal dimensions of ownership of knowledge, 
the difficulties in disembedding knowledge from those who know it, and the need 
for knowledge transfer to involve a learning process. Arguing that a knowledge 
economy is different, not only to an industrial economy but also to an information 
economy, they emphasise how ‘the importance of people as creators and carriers 
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of knowledge is forcing organisations to realise that knowledge lies less in its 
databases than in its people’ (Brown and Duguid 2000: 121). Pointing to the 
limits of knowledge management by means of distribution of knowledge through 
ICTs, such as ‘best practice’ knowledge in an organisation, they differentiate 
between networks of practice, or the distribution of knowledge within an 
organisation through newsletters, Web sites, e-mail, online discussion lists etc., 
and communities of practice, or the ways in which people in an organisation 
acquire knowledge through a shared, and typically face-to-face, learning process. 
In order to build communities with a shared commitment to knowledge creation 
and knowledge sharing, Brown and Duguid argue for the development of 
communities of practice, and indicate that the transition from ‘atoms’ to ‘bits’ 
should not be seen as a one-off, linear process, since ‘there are advantages to 
working together, however well people may be connected by technology’ (Brown 
and Duguid 2000: 146).  
 
Brown and Duguid’s observations about the embodiment of knowledge and 
learning in people and communities is supported by Andy Pratt’s (2000) 
observation that knowledge in the new economy is characterised not only by its 
weightlessness but also by its embeddedness in people, locations, networks and 
institutions, and the related point that cultural activity and employment is not only 
growing, but is becoming more tied to places, especially cities. Justin O’Connor 
(1999b) has connected this to new modes of cultural production and consumption 
among the young (18-35 years old) in urban centres, associated with what 
sociologists Scott Lash and John Urry (1994) have termed reflexive accumulation, 
where consumption takes increasingly expressive and symbolic forms as 
expressive of one’s identity and positioning within a local culture, which in turn 
feeds into new ‘postmodern’ modes of cultural production, characterised by 
O’Connor where: 
 
1. Making money and making culture are one and the same activity; 
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2. There is an antipathy to distinguishing between ‘work time’ and ‘leisure 
time’; 
3. There is a heavy reliance on informal networks for information and ideas; 
4. There is an emphasis on intuition, emotional involvement, immersion in 
the field, and an ‘enthusiast’s’ knowledge of the market; 
5. Cultural producers desire to ‘work for themselves’ and outside of the ‘9-
to-5’ routine.  
 
Such a workforce is central to the development of content for new media. In 
identifying content as a new growth industry, the OECD has observed that 
‘content creation for large media companies is already often outsourced to small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs) … SMEs are in a number of instances becoming 
the seedbeds of innovative content creation in digital technologies’ (OECD 1998: 
5). The growth of the new media sector in New York’s ‘Silicon Alley’ in the 
1990s was driven by freelance workers and SMEs. Pavlik (1999) has observed 
that of the 4,881 new media companies in New York in 1997, 68 per cent had 
been in business for less than three years, and 30 per cent had been established in 
the last eighteen months. Factors that promoted the development of new media 
industries in New York in the 1990s included the availability of a large pool of 
creative talent; proximity to customers, particularly in the traditional media and 
publishing sectors; availability of extensive support services; and the image and 
credibility of the city. Kenney and von Burg (2000) have observed that the 
development of the San Francisco Bay Area, or ‘Silicon Valley’, was based upon 
the development of two interconnecting economic structures. The first (economy 
One) was established organisations and those who supported their activities, such 
as specialist suppliers, customers and research institutions such as universities. 
The second (Economy Two) was the institutional infrastructure that had emerged 
to support the creation and growth of new firms, or start-ups.  
 
In the case of both New York’s ‘Silicon Alley’ and San Francisco’s ‘Silicon 
Valley’, there is a complex and embedded relationship between creativity, 
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innovation, knowledge transfer and entrepreneurship, which has opened up 
considerable debate - to be considered below - about what are the conditions for 
developing creative industries in particular cities and regions, and can the 
experiences of one city or region be translated into success in other places. There 
is an argument, to be explored in more detail below, that creative personnel, and 
those establishing SMEs and microbusinesses, seek not only work opportunities, 
bandwidth and venture capital, but also a creative milieux in which to establish 
these enterprises, that generates pleasure, enthusiasm and networking 
opportunities with other creative people. The relationship between ‘creative cities’ 
and ‘creative regions’ and the supply of creativity and innovation will be 
considered in more detail below.  
 
Services Employment and the Services Industry Model 
 
A third major trend in advanced capitalist economies has been the rise of the 
services industries. In terms of both employment and the share of total output, the 
services industries have grown in significance for most of the 20th century, and 
especially in the period after 1970. Castells and Aoyama (1994) traced trends in 
non-farm employment in the leading industrial economies (or the Group of Seven, 
or G-7 economies) in terms of the proportions of the workforce involved in 
industrial and services activities, and in the handling of goods or information. 
They observed significant shifts in all G-7 economies, especially in the United 
Kingdom and the United States, which could now be considered to be 
predominantly services-based economies. Importantly, Castells and Aoyama’s 
analysis indicates that, in terms of employment, advanced capitalist economies 
become service industry-based economies before they become information or 
knowledge economies, as services industries are typically more labour-intensive 
and less able to be automated than both manufacturing and information-based 
industries. This is seen in the higher growth of the services: industry ratio than the 
information: goods ratio in the table below.  
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Table 6.4 
Employment Trends in Selected G-7 Economies 1920-1990 
 Germany Japan United 
Kingdom 
United States 
 1920 1970 1990 1920 1970 1990 1920 1970 1990 1920 1970 1990 
Industry 59.1 51.2 41.5 46.3 42.1 35.8 53.0 49.4 29.6 48.0 34.0 24.9 
Services 40.9 48.8 58.5 53.7 57.9 64.2 47.0 50.6 70.4 52.0 66.0 75.1 
Goods 
Handling 
78.8 71.4 60.8 76.8 73.0 65.9 76.3 67.6 54.2 73.3 61.2 51.7 
Information 
Handling 
21.2 29.1 39.2 23.2 26.9 33.4 23.7 32.2 45.8 26.7 39.0 48.3 
Services: 
industry 
(ratio) 
0.7 1.0 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.8 0.9 1.0 2.4 1.1 1.9 3.0 
Information: 
Goods 
(ratio) 
0.3 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.9 
 
Source: Castells and Aoyama 1994, pp. 15-16.  
 
Any discussion of the size and significance of the services sector raises a number 
of conceptual and analytical problems. The first is that any attempt to measure the 
size of the services sector comes up against the inadequacy of existing methods of 
gathering industrial data. This reflects the tendency of the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) categories, developed in the heyday of manufacturing 
industry, to make detailed classification within industry, but to treat services as a 
residual category, defined as those activities that are not agriculture, mining, 
construction, utilities or manufacturing. As a result, simply observing the growth 
of service industries employment may be in part a statistical illusion, generated by 
inadequate classificatory schemas. It may also not be particularly informative, 
since the term covers so many disparate industries and forms of employment that 
the implications of services industries growth may be hard to determine. Castells 
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and Aoyama (1994) disaggregate the services sector to some extent by 
differentiating between: 
 
1. Producer services, such as business and professional services, financial 
and insurance services, and real estate; 
2. Distributive services, or those services associated with transportation and 
communication; 
3. Social services, including government services, and other health, 
education and welfare services; 
4. Personal services, such as tourism and recreation, entertainment and 
hospitality, domestic, retailing, and services associated with personal 
appearance and well-being (eg. hairdressing, fitness services).  
 
Another issue arising from consideration of services is their relationship to 
industrial production. There has been a tendency, first emerging in classical 
political economy, to see the production of physical output as constituting the 
‘real economy’, and to see services as essentially derivative activities, or else as 
largely unproductive and wasteful (Allen and du Gay 1994). A contemporary 
variant of this argument sees services industry work as involving the creation of 
poorly-paid, low-skill jobs with high employee turnover – so-called ‘McJobs’, 
after the McDonalds fast food chain – or as being symptomatic of an unbalanced 
economy that is highly vulnerable to economic fluctuations, such as economies 
that are strongly based on tourism and migration, such as the state of Florida in 
the United States, island nations such as Bermuda and the Bahamas, or the Gold 
Coast region in Australia. Such negative perceptions of the services sector, which 
emerged in part as a reaction to overly optimistic assessments of ‘post-industrial 
society’ (Castells 1999), have obscured some important points. Most importantly, 
it obscures the growing convergence between manufacturing and services. Larry 
Hirschhorn (1988) has argued that the growing significance of design and service 
principles in the delivery of quality products to meet more specialised customer 
expectations, combined with the move from mass production to flexible 
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production aimed at niche markets, means that service-based and knowledge-
based activities are integral to contemporary commodity production in all of its 
sectoral forms. As a result, while services sector industries are becoming 
industrialised and using ICTs to enhance productivity, manufacturing industries 
are increasingly adopting the ‘relational’ elements of product sale and delivery 
that have historically typified the services sector (cf. Allen and du Gay 1994).  
 
Such developments are particularly relevant to the cultural and creative industries. 
Andy Pratt (1997) has argued that the nature of the cultural industries value chain 
is such that clear distinctions between content creation, manufacture and 
distribution, and final delivery of a product or service, are difficult to make, and 
are becoming more difficult as new media technologies are increasingly applied at 
all stages of the value chain. Scott Lash and John Urry have argued that, contrary 
to the dire predictions about the industrialization of culture in advanced 
capitalism, other manufacturing and services industries are increasingly taking on 
characteristics of the cultural industries: 
 
Even in the heyday of Fordism, the culture industries were irretrievably 
more innovation intensive, more design intensive than other industries. 
The culture industries, in other words, were post-Fordist avant la lettre. … 
Our claim is that ordinary manufacturing industry is becoming more and 
more like the production of culture. It is not that commodity manufacture 
provides the template, and culture follows, but that the culture industries 
themselves have provided the template. (Lash and Urry 1994: 123) 
 
Their argument is that contemporary models of ‘flexible production’ are not 
merely more knowledge-intensive, with increased flexibility being associated 
with the need to incorporate more detailed information about customers, service 
and product quality into the production process. They are also more design 
intensive, and hence more explicitly cultural, since the inputs are not only 
informational, but also aesthetic, and value adding involves the acquisition of 
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sign-value properties associated with the brand and the image of the product. 
There is also a growing significance attached in all sectors of the economy to 
product research & development, and the testing and trailing of prototypes, which 
is very much in keeping with the development of the cultural or creative 
industries, where the production of physical commodities is a minor sub-set of the 
activities associated with discovering creativity and distributing and marketing it 
to identifiable sections of the community.  
 
Cluster Development and Creative Cities and Regions 
 
A further element of creative industries development is the emphasis upon 
locational geography, and particularly the formation of creative industries 
clusters. The development of creative cities and regions in the knowledge-based 
economy has been associated with what Harvard Business School economist 
Michael Porter (1998) has described as the development of clusters. Porter 
defines clusters as ‘geographic concentrations of interconnected companies and 
institutions in a particular field’ (Porter 1998: 78). The elements of a cluster can 
include suppliers of specialised inputs, providers of specialised infrastructure, 
producers of complementary products and services, specialist customers, and 
universities and research institutions that provide specialist knowledge, training, 
information, education and technical support. New York’s ‘Silicon Alley’ and the 
San Francisco Bay Area’s ‘Silicon Valley’ are two examples of clusters in the 
high-technology sector, but others include the Californian wine industry, the 
Italian leather fashion industry, the German chemicals industry, and the 
Hollywood film industry. Clusters generate competitive advantage for those 
within them in three ways. First, they increase the productivity of firms within the 
cluster through access to specialist inputs, labour, knowledge and technology. 
Second, they promote innovation, by making all forms aware more quickly of 
new opportunities, as well as enhancing the capacity for rapid and flexible 
responses to new opportunities. Third, they promote new business formation in 
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related sectors, through distinctive access to necessary labour, skills, knowledge, 
technology and capital. 
 
The significance of clusters to ICT development and creative industries is at first 
glance paradoxical, since a characteristic of economic processes that are 
increasingly informational, global and networked would seem to point to the 
declining significance of geographical location to economic activity. In contrast to 
traditional performing arts and cultural industries, where consumption in real time 
in defined geographical spaces is central, distribution through new media 
technologies points to the delivery of content to the home, workplace, educational 
institution or other sites that are not linked to the geographical site of production. 
The development of the Internet as a global content distribution network means 
that, subject to available bandwidth capacity, content creators can be promiscuous 
and footloose in where they sell or distribute their content to, just as content 
distributors can source material from many points of the globe. This is in contrast 
to traditional national cultural policies, where national cultural authorities have 
sought to use funding to direct cultural production towards particular national 
cultural goals.  
 
The declining significance of place was one prediction that was commonly made 
in the early development of new media technologies. One way to understand the 
continuing significance of place in the new economy is to note the stalled history 
of tele-working, or working from home. Contrary to earlier predictions, the level 
of tele-working, or tele-commuting, is about 2 to 3 per cent of the workforce in 
OECD economies.  By contrast, what has grown dramatically has been 
‘supplementary work’, or working professionals undertaking additional tasks 
from home, or from other designated workspaces, as well as working in their 
offices, which means that an increasing number of workers have an ‘office-on-
the-run’, as well as a designated workspace. Part of the reason for this lack of a 
shift to tele-working no doubt lies in the distinction between information and 
knowledge observed by Brown and Duguid (2000); all imformation is accessible 
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over the Internet from home, but the cognitive processes through which 
information is transformed into knowledge occur through the development of a 
shared understanding among one’s peers, and that, more often than not, happens 
in the workplace. 
 
The significance of geographically-defined clusters arises not only from the limits 
of teleworking, but also from the nature of networked knowledge 
entrepreneurship. Such entrepreneurs increasingly require location within and 
around sites that provide relatively low-cost, modern office space, access to high-
speed bandwidth and high-end facilities, and access to networks of individuals 
and companies with complementary skills, particularly business and legal skills. 
Castells and Hall identified these as milieux of innovation, which has a spatial 
dimension based upon complementary skills co-existing within a particular site, 
but which is primarily ‘based on a social organisation that by and large shares a 
work culture and instrumental goals aimed at generating new knowledge, new 
processes, and new products’ (Castells 1996: 389-390). Such sites can include 
what Saskia Sassen (1991) identified as global cities, such as New York, London, 
Paris, Tokyo, Singapore and Sydney, or what Castells and Hall termed 
technopoles such as Silicon Valley, New York’s ‘Silicon Alley’, Boston’s Route 
128, the ‘Cyberjaya’ development in Malaysia’s Multimedia Supercorridor, and 
the Shenzhen special economic zone in China (Castells and Hall, 1994). The  
development of Silicon Valley as a high-tech entrepreneurial region rested in part 
upon its two economies: established organisations such as Hewlett-Packard and 
the supplier, producer services, consumer and research organisations that 
clustered around them; and the network of new entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, 
and suppliers of producer services that supported the development of new SMEs 
(Kenney and von Burg 2000).  
 
A number of cities and regions have sought to develop their creative and cultural 
industries through public intervention, either in response to the decline of other 
sectors such as industrial manufacturing, or in response to the absence of a 
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perceived economic base in other sectors. Within such frameworks, culture is not 
understood simply as a competitor for consumer spending, or as a supplement to 
everyday life and commerce, but as a central wealth-creating component of the 
new economy. Charles Landry (2000) has drawn attention to the significance of a 
creative miliex to the development of creativity in modern cities and regions, 
which he defined as a combination of hard infrastructure, or the network of 
building and institutions that constitute a city or a region, and soft infrastructure, 
defined as ‘the system of associative structures and social networks, connections 
and human interactions, that underpins and encourages the flow of ideas between 
individuals and institutions’ (Landry 2000: 133).  
 
The concept of ‘soft infrastructure’ is a reminder that networks are never simply 
technological, or clusters simply institutional or economic; both are embedded in 
systems of ongoing interaction among institutions in communities, frequently 
linked in physical and interpersonal rather than virtual terms. It is also an 
indicator of the importance of creativity, not simply in the development of new 
products, services or IT code, but in the development of a dynamic city or region. 
Lovatt and O’Connor (1995) have referred to the importance of a city’s night-time 
economy as a factor in the development of sustainable creative infrastructure, and 
as a potential source of locational advantage in a globalised economy. As the city 
is increasingly a site of consumption, and a site of cultural, creative and services 
production, rather than of industrial production or ‘9-to-5’ office work, the 
leisure, entertainment, hospitality and tourism sectors are increasingly important 
elements of the ‘night-time economy’, or the range of activities undertaken by 
tourists and by locals outside of the hours of formal work or study. As they note, 
such developments require innovative public policy thinking, that sees activities 
associated with the night-life of a city, not as a problem for local authorities, but 
as both a source of new opportunities for creative industries development, and as 
part of a creative milieu that gives a city or region a dynamic image, and acts as 
an attractor to creative personnel in globally networked new economy industries.  
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